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the principle on which one state will give effect to the law of another,
not because it is obligated to do so, but because it is more courteous
and convenient. 26 As no state is bound to give effect to the law of
another, many states extend this courtesy only to states which grant
them similar privileges. This has been called the theory of reciprocity,
and, although it is frequently applied, 27 it has been condemned by courts
holding that comity is not a mere courtesy, but a legal right which
should not be denied for any reason so flimsy as that of reciprocity. 28
Another approach to the problem, advocated by scholars and gaining
ground with the courts, is that, in an accurate sense, the forum does
not apply any theory such as that of comity, but rather its own set of
rules applicable in cases involving a foreign element, or in other words,
its own law of. conflict of laws. 29
ELIZABETH SHEWMAAKE.
Taxation-Constitutional Law-Exemption
of Governmental Instrumentalities.
The Port of New York Authority is a municipal corporate instru-
mentality organized under a compact between the states of New York
and New Jersey for the purpose of improving the port of New York
and facilitating its use by the construction and operation of bridges,
tunnels, terminals and other facilities. In pursuance of its purpose it
has constructed the Outerbridge Crossing, the Bayonne, Goethals, and
George Washington bridges, the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the
Port Authority Commerce Building of New York City, and operates
an interstate bus line over one of the bridges. The Authority has been
financed by funds advanced by the two states, revenue from the sale
of its own bonds, and income from bridge and tunnel tolls and from
bus fares. This action was brought by the United States Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to collect federal income taxes assessed against a
construction engineer and two assistant general managers employed
by the Port Authority. Held, employees of the Authority are not
exempt from the federal income tax because no burden is imposed there-
-"See Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., 7 F. (2d) 470,
473 (D. Del. 1925); Herron v-. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 823, 110 So. 539,
542 (1926).
- Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930) ; Farmers' and Mer-
chants' State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N. W. 827 (1913); Hart v.
Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96 (1933).
2 Fuller- v. Webster, 5 Boyce 539, 95 Atl. 335 (Super. Ct. Del. 1915), aff'd,
6 Boyce 297, 99 Atl. 1069 (Sup. Ct Del. 1916) ; Hughes v. Winkleman, 243 Mo.
81, 247 S. W. 994 (1912); RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIr OF LAWS (1934) §6,
comment a.WCook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE L. J. 457.
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by upon a state instrumentality performing an essential governmental
function.'
In M'Culloch v. Maryland2 Chief Justice John Marshall laid down
the principle that a state may not levy special taxes upon instrumentali-
ties of the Federal Government, for to allow such discriminatory taxa-
tion would be to deny the supremacy of that Government and subject
its operations to possible interference and control by the respective states,
in contravention of the implications of the United States Constitution.
Marshall's doctrine of the supremacy of the Federal Government over
the state governments was religiously adhered to while he occupied the
position of Chief Justice, and for some years thereafter, and was made
the basis for declaring state taxes levied upon federal securities as
such3 and upon salaries of federal officials 4 unconstitutional.
The first serious extension 5 of the principle enunciated in M'Culloch
v. Maryland came during the Civil War when the Supreme Court ruled
that United States securities were exempt from a non-discriminatory
state tax levied upon all bank property. 6 But, although Marshall's pro-
hibition against discriminatory taxation was thus extended to include
non-discriminatory taxation, his principle of the supremacy of the
Federal Government was upheld and applied.7 Seven years later the
Court was confronted for the first time8 with the question whether the
Federal Government might tax a state instrumentality and, for the last
time in the field of taxation,9 the theory of the superiority of the na-
tional sovereignty was made the basis for the decision.1° In this case
a federal tax on banks measured by the amount of state notes paid
out by them was upheld."
' Helvering v. Gerhardt, - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
962 (1938).
24 Wheat. 415, 4 L. ed. 389 (U. S. 1819).
'Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 448, 7 L. ed. 481 (U. S. 1829) (Marshall, writing
the opinion, stated that ". . . we have considered it as a necessary consequence,
from the supremacy of the government of the whole, that its action, in the exer-
cise of its legitimate powers, should be free and unembarrassed by any con-
flicting powers in the possession of its parts. . . ." Italics inserted.)
'Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022
(U. S. 1842) (The line of reasoning here was that Congress fixes the amount
to be earned by the officer; a tax levied on such officer diminishes the amount
so fixed by Congress; hence the tax conflicts with the law of Congress, which
is the supreme law of the land because made in pursuance of the United States
Constitution, and the tax is therefore invalid.)
'Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 22 GEO.
L. J. 1, 254.
People v. Tax Commissioners, 2 Black 620, 17 L. ed. 451 (U. S. 1863).7 Boudin, supra note 5, at 25. 81d. at 29.
' Philipsborn and Cantrill, Iminnity from Taxation of Governmental Instrut-
mentalities (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 543, 551.
","It was the first time that the claim of exemption on behalf of state in-
strumentalities had come before the Supreme Court-in itself a weighty piece
of evidence against the existence of such exemption or the claim of parity and
state sovereignty on which it is based." Boudin, supra note 5, at 29.
=Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (U. S. 1869).
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The reasoning in M'Culloch v. Maryland remained effective only
three. more years. In 1870 the momentous decision of Collector v.
Day'2 repudiated Marshall's principle that the Federal Government is
supreme. This opinion held a state judge exempt from a general, non-
discriminatory federal income tax on the ground that the sovereignty
of the state governments is equal to that of the Federal Government
and, hence, that instrumentalities of either government are reciprocally
immune from taxation by the other.
As neither government may tax the instrumentalities of the other,
the question has repeatedly arisen as to what constitutes a govern-
mental instrumentality.'3 The Supreme Court has held that a bond
required by a state of a licensed liquor dealer,14 a lease of Indian
lands,15 a lessee of Indian lands, 16 a lease of state lands,17 a mortgage
executed to a federal corporation,' 8 patents issued by the Federal Gov-
ernment,19 corporations whose stock is owned by a government,20 cor-
porate franchises granted by the Federal Government,2 ' government
bonds, 22 and municipal waterworks23 are all governmental instrumen-
talities. On the other hand, it has held that the following are not: a
bank in which state funds were deposited ;24 land purchased from the
United States subject to the contingency that the purchaser build a dry
' 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (U. S. 1870).
' Philipsborn and Cantrill, supra note 9.
"'Ambrosini v. United States, 178 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1, 47 L. ed. 49 (1902).
"Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup.
Ct 453, 60 L. ed. 779 (1916) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct.
171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922), overruled by 'Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
- U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 607 (1938).
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59
L. ed. 234 (1914); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct.
592, 70 L. ed. 1112 (1926).
' Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed.
815 (1932), (1932) 21 CXLrF. L. Rv. 172, (1933) 27 Ira. L. REv. 172, (1932)
11 TEx. L. REv. 120. This case was overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp., - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. 607 (1938).
'Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed.
703 (1923).
"Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928),
(1928) 27 MIcH. L. Ray. 225.
Clallarn County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed.
328 (1923); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371,
72 L. ed. 693 (1928); New York ex rel. Rogers .v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57
Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937), (1937) 21 MINN. L. REv. 867, (1937) 2 Mo.
L. Ray. 372, (1937) 11 U. oF Cixr. L. Rav. 540.
1 California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1013, 32 L. ed.
150 (1888).
' Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1889); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571,
51 L. ed. 901 (1907); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S.
136, Q Sup. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202 (1927).
' Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495, 81
L. ed. 691 (1937), (1937) 12 IND. L. J. 421, (1937) 21 MINN. L. Rav. 866, (1937)
14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 550.
'Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 148 U. S. 412, 13 Sup. Ct. 64, 37 L. ed. 504 (1893).
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dock thereon and allow United States vessels to use it free of charge ;25
a surety on bonds given by United States officers ;26 personal property
used in the performance of a contract with the Federal Government ;27
independent contractors carrying on work for the Government ;28 cor-
porations licensed by the Federal Government. 29 A glance at these
cases will convince the reader that, whatever the reasoning in each
case may be, the results are neither logical nor consistent.
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, it next becomes
necessary to determine a second question: Is the tax from which
exemption is sought actually a tax on the instrumentality? Or, as it
has been phrased by the courts, is the burden imposed by the tax direct,
or is it too remote to interfere with any governmental function? °
Here, again, the decisions are highly inconsistent, for the so-called
"burden test ' 31 is necessarily indefinite and confusing, since the terms
"direct" and "remote" are in themselves intangible, and the degrees of
each are infinite. Intergovernmental tax immunity has been allowed as
to taxes ranging all the way from an income tax on dividends paid by
a corporation out of a surplus which was built up-in part with interest
received on United States bonds3 2 to an excise tax levied upon gasoline
distributors from whom purchases were made by federal agencies.33
But the Court has held the burden imposed to be too remote to warrant
exemption of a state university from payment of duties levied upon
scientific equipment imported for use in its laboratories, 34 or of an
independent contractor from payment of an income tax upon compensa-
' Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 50,
49 L. ed. 242 (1904).
'Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 36 Sup. Ct. ?98,
60 L. ed. 664 (1916).
2Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 Sup. Ct. 499, 56
L. ed. 801 (1912).
" Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384
(1926), (1926) 39 'HARv. L. Rzv. 768, (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 38; Trinity-
farm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.-S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. ed.
918 (1935); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208,
82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 125 (1937), (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 308, (1938) 24
VA. L. REv. 455; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm., 302 U. S. 190, 58 Sup. Ct.
233, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 154 (1938); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 302 U. S.
641, 58 Sup. Ct 419, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 440 (1938).
"Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 291, 51 Sup. Ct. 434,
75 L. ed. 1042 (1931); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 53
Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. ed. 685 (1933); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 Sup. Ct. 267, 78 L. ed. 622 (1933).
' The amount of the tax is immaterial. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514,
46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384 (1926).
'Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 948; (1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 766.
'Miller v. Milwaukee, 273 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280, 71 L. ed. 487 (1926).
' Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857
(1928), (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 128, (1928) 27 MIcii. L. Rv. 225, (1928) 14
ST. Louis L. REv. 86.
"' Board of Trustees of U. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 53 Sup. Ct.
509, 77 L. ed. 1025 (1933).
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tion received for construction work done for the United States.35
These examples are typical of the inconsistent results the Supreme
Court has reached in applying the "burden test", and nearly all of the
cases in which the test is applied are similarly confusing.3 0
'James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 125 (1937).
*The Supreme Court has allowed exemptions in the following cases: Forbes
v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313 (1877) (tax on proceeIs from mines
located on United States lands); United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 17
Wall. 322, 21 L. ed. 597 (U. S. 1878) (tax upon interest on municipal bonds) ;
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39
L. ed. 759 (1895) (tax on income derived from municipal bonds by private
person or corporation); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27
Sup. Ct. 571, 51 L. ed. 901 (1907) (tax on bank, measured by amount of surplus
where surplus composed in part of government securities) ; Farmers' & Mechanics'
Say. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354, 58 L. ed. 706 (1914) (tax
on surplus composed in part of bonds issued by municipality of a territory)
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. ed.
234 (1914) (tax on gross production of minerals by a lessee of Indian lands);
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup. Ct.
453, 60 L. ed. 779 (1916) (tax on corporate stock, the only value of the stock
being the value of a lease ofi Indian lands) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.
501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922) (tax on income derived from Indian
lands) ; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed.
703 (1923) (tax on recordation of mortgage executed to federal agency) ; Clallam
County v. United States, 263 U. S. 342, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed. 328 (1923)
(tax on real and personal propeity belonging to a federal corporation); Jaybird
Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L. ed. 1112 (1926) (ad
valoremt tax on ore produced and stored by lessee of Indian lands) ; Northwestern
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202
(1927) (tax on corporate franchise measured by income derived in part from
interest on government bonds); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S.
547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 72 L. ed. 693 (1928) (tax on land mortgaged to a federal
agency); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824
(1928) (tax on income in the form of patent royalties); Macallen Co. v.
Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 874 (1929) (tax on cor-
porate franchise measured by income derived in part from interest on govern-
ment bonds) ; Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313, 50 Sup, Ct. 326, 74 L. ed. 870
(1930) (tax on net.worth where ownership of federal securities was taken into
account in determining the net worth) ; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 393, 51 Sup. Ct 601, 75 L. ed. 1277 (1931) (tax on sale of police
equipment to a municipality) ; Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1932) (tax on income derived from state
lands by the lessee thereof) ; New York ex -rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S.
401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937) (tax on income of general counsel for
federal corporation) ; Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352,
57 Sup. Ct. 495, 81 L. ed. 691 (1937) (tax on income of chief engineer of
municipal waterworks). But the Court has refused to grant immunity, on the
ground that the -burden imposed upon a governmental function is too remote, in
the following cases: Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 48
Sup. Ct. 333, 72 L. ed. 709 (1928) (tax on property belonging to lessee of
Indian lands); Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281
U. S. 572, 50 Sup. Ct. 419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1930) (tax on transportation of goods
delivered to a county f.o.b. point of delivery); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. 804 (1931) (tax on income derived from resale
of county and municipal bonds); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S.
379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400 (1931) (franchise tax measured by income
derived in part from royalties on copyrights granted by Federal Government);
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 51 Sup, Ct. 273, 75 L. ed. 496 (1931) (tax on
gross receipts of automotive stage line, including compensation from Federal
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The Court applied, in the instant case, a limitation on the doctrine
of immunity of governmental instrumentalities which tends to con-
found the law to an even greater extent. This is the requirement that,
in order to be exempt from taxation, the instrumentality must perform
an "essential governmental" function. It was first applied37 'in South
Carolina v. United States,38 in which it was held that persons conduct-
ing a liquor business on behalf of the state, in the form of a state
dispensing system, were not immune from a federal license tax because
the function performed was not essentially governmental in nature.
Because of the vast extension of governmental activities into new and.
varied fields in modem times,3 9 this limitation is being applied more
and more often and with increasing strictness. 40 Hence, yet another
question is becoming vital in the determination of intergovernmental
tax immunity: Does the particular instrumentality perform an "essential
governmental" function? In deciding that corporations organized pur-
suant to a state law and conducting private businesses thereunder are
not exempt from a federal franchise tax, the Court, in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co.,4 1 defined functions which are essentially governmental as
Government for mail transportation); Group No. 1 Oil Co. v. Bass, 283 U. S.
279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432, 75 L. ed. 1032 (1931) (tax on income derived from lands
leased from a state); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct.
546, 76 L. ed. 1010 (1932) (tax on gross receipts of copyright royalties) ; Broad
River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. ed. 685 (1933)
(tax on production and sale of electric power under federal license); Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, 53 Sup.
Ct. 388, 77 L. ed. 812 (1933) (ad valorem tax on oil produced by lessee from
Indian lands) ; Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439,
77 L. ed. 925 (1933) (tax on income derived from land leased from a munici-
pality) ; Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct.
469, 78 L. ed. 918 (1934) (tax on gasoline used by independent contractor in
execution of government construction contract); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 299 U. S. 388, 57 Sup. Ct. 239, 81 L. ed. 294 (1937) (stamp
tam on tobacco sold to a state hospital) ; Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co., 300 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 334, 81 L. ed. 463 (1937) (ad valoren tax on
property belonging to lessee of Indian lands) ; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., -
U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 618 (1938) (tax on income received
from lands leased from state); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., -
U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 607 (1938) (tax on income derived
from lands leased from state).
= Johnson, Federal Taxation Affecting State Instrumentalities (1934) 68
U. S. L. Rzv. 248; notes (1935) 24 CAmF. L. REv. 110,'(1935) 33 MicH. L.
REv. 1283, (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 550, (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 194,
(1937) 3 U. OF PrsBURGH L. Rev. 259.
83199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, -50 L. ed. 261 (1905) (This problem has
again arisen since the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The decision in the
South Carolina case was upheld in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 54 Sup. Ct.
725. 78 L. ed. 1307 (1934) on a similar set of facts.)
' See Culp, Creation of Government Corporations by the National Governnnt
(1935) 33 MxcH. L. REv. 473; Philipsborn and Cantrill, Immunity from Taxation
of Governmental Instrumentalities (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 543; notes (1936) 49
HARv. L. RE v. 1323, (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 426.
1 (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 442, (1934) 21 VA. L. REv. 120.
0 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1911).
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"those operations of the States essential to the execution of its govern-
mental functions, and which the State alon can do itself.... .142 The
case of Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,4" decided in 1931,
invalidating a federal sales tax levied upon the sale to a municipality of
a motorcycle for use by its police force, seems to fit into this definition,
as does a decision to the effect that the operation of a street railway
by a state is not such a usual44 governmental function as to allow
exemption of the members of the board of trustees of such railway
from a federal income tax.4 5 But several recent cases are not so clear.
In New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves48 the relator was allowed to
escape payment of a state income tax because of his position as gen-
eral counsel for the Panama Railroad Company, a federal corporation
operating a dairy, two hotels, a railroad and a commissary establishment
in the Panama Canal Zone, and a steamship line. Shortly afterward
it was held that a municipal waterworks performs an essential govern-
mental function, and hence that an engineer employed to supervise its
operation does not have to pay a federal income tax.4 7 But the liquida-
tion of banks,48 operations under a lease of state lands, 49 and the con-
ducting of football games by a state university50 have since been held
to be non-essential governmental functions and therefore not immune
from federal taxation.
These recent applications of the "essential governmental function"
test seemingly reveal a trend back to the results of, if not the reason-
ing behind, the doctrine of federal supremacy as laid down by Marshall
in M'Culloch v. Maryland.51 The Supreme Court has applied this
test only to allow taxation of state instrumentalities by the Federal
Government, 52 and immunity has been granted federal instrumentalities
engaged in activities far less essentially governmental than many en-
'1d. at 172, 31 Sup. Ct. at 357, 55 L. ed. at 422. (Italics inserted.)
' 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L. ed. 1277 (1931).
"The Supreme Court has granted immunity where the activities engaged in
were: "usual" governmental functions, "traditional" governmental functions, and
"essential" governmental functions. (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 550. But
there seems to be little real distinction between these terms.
'Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171, 79 L. ed. 291 (1934),
note (1935) 24 CALIF. L. Rav. 110, (1935) 33 MicH. L. Ray. 1283.
'3299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937).
'Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495,
81 L. ed. 691 (1937).
' Helvering v. Therrell, - U. S. - 58 Sup. Ct. 539, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
537 (1938).
"Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 618 (1938).
0 Allen v. Regents of The Univ. System of Ga., - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct.
980, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 975 (1938). Circuit court decision discussed in note(1938) 16 -N. C. L. REv. 292. ' Note (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 430.
' Johnson, supra note 37; note (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 1323.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
gaged in by state agencies to which exemption has been refused.53
In the Graves case, the Court intimated, for the first time, 54 that the
test applies to federal agencies, but it allowed exemption of an instru-
mentality performing a function no more essentially governmental than
that performed by the state agency in the principal case. The Graves
case, then, when compared with other recent decisions, raises the ques-
tion of whether the "essential governmental function" test actually does
apply to federal instrumentalities. An argument against such applica-
tion is that the Federal Government is a government of delegated
powers, and hence every federal activity undertaken in pursuance of
those powers is of necessity essentially governmental.5 5 But this ques-
tion must remain open to conjecture for the present, although the
Graves case furnishes some indication that the Court may eventually
nullify the "essential governmental" test insofar as federal agencies
are concerned.
The attitude of the Treasury Department,5 6 resulting from an
opinion rendered to it by the Department of Justice,57 has caused wide-
spread fear that the effect of Helvering v. Gerhardt will be to destroy
all immunity now enjoyed by state employees from the federal income
tax. Such an interpretation of the decision would probably result in
increased cost of state government, thereby adding to the burden of
the state taxpayer without correspondingly lightening the burden of the
federal taxpayer, for it does not necessarily follow that an increase in
federal revenue will decrease federal taxes. This interpretation would
seriously impair states' rights as set forth in Collector v. Day. But do
those rights rest on valid grounds? As pointed out by Marshall in
M'Culloch v. Maryland,58 the people of all the states, including the
ones affected, have a voice, through their representatives in Congress,
in the levying of federal taxes upon state agencies, while only a small
OBrown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State
Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations, 1932-35 (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 584;
(1935) 20 ST. Louis L. Rxv. 290.
r'Note (1937) 3 U. OF PrrTsBUmGH L. Ryv. 259; (1937) 11 U. OF CiN. L.
REv. 540.
SLoundes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 1; Stoke, State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities,
(1936) 22 IowA L. REV. 39; notes (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 430, (1937) 3 U.
OF PirrSBuRGH L. REv. 259. An argument which has been advanced against this
is that the holding in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct.
110, 50 L. ed. 261 (1905) was that a "State cannot withdraw sources of revenue
from the federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a
departure from usual governmental functions", and that the rule thus stated
would apply to federal as well as state instrumentalities. Note (1936) 49
IARv. L. REv. 1323, 1325.
0 N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1938, p. 18, col. 1.
'IN. Y. Times, July 22, 1938, p. 27, col. 1.
'4 Wheat. 316, 435, 4 L. ed. 389, 608 (U. S. 1819).
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part of the people of the United States control the laying of a tax upon
a federal instrumentality by a particular state. Hence the opinion as
construed by the Department of Justice would merely be a step back
toward the doctrine of M'Culloch v. Maryland, the decision out of
which all intergovernmental tax immunity developed. But the case
does not seem to go so far, and apparently the rule that all federal
instrumentalities are exempt from state taxation, while only those state
instrumentalities which perform essential governmental functions are
immune from federal taxes imposing a direct burden, remains un-
changed. The decision does, however, further confound the shadowy
concepts of what constitutes a "direct burden" and an "essential gov-
ernmental function."
Helvering v. Gerhardt is a clear illustration of the present tendency
on the part of the courts to limit intergovernmental tax exemptions.
Such limitation is economically desirable for a number of reasons.5 9
Tax exemptions seem to increase as governmental activities expand;
but the cost of government likewise increases with such expansion, and
exemptions paradoxically cut down governmental revenue. Many
privately owned businesses must compete with similar governmentally
owned enterprises which have no tax burden. Furthermore, persons
employed by one government derive the same benefits from the other
government as do private individuals, but they do not have to contribute
to the costs of such benefits. 60 Why, then, should such a vast multiplicity
of exemptions be allowed? The courts have lost sight of the reason
for the rule of tax immunity-the prevention of reciprocal destruction
of state and federal governments. The power to tax is not the power
to destroy unless it is exercised with discrimination. 0 1 The confusion
in the law may be cleared up, the economic evils of exemptions may be
eliminated, and the existence of governments safeguarded by restricting
all immunity from intergovernmental taxation to those cases, and only
those cases, where the tax complained of discriminates against a partic-
ular government.
JAMES D. CARR.
See Brabson, Income Tax Exemptions and the Loss of Federal Revenues
(1937) 15 TAx MAG. 8. One example given by Mr. Brabson is that only 1.39%
of those receiving income are paying a federal income tax, a condition caused
to a large extent by intergovernmental tax immunity.
"See concurring opinion of Black, J., in Helvering v. Gerhardt. Mr. Justice
Black points out that the words of the Sixteenth Amendment, "collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived", give Congress the power to collect
taxes on the incomes of all state employees. He further maintains that the
Court should "review and reexamine the rule based upon Collector v. Day", and
that such vague doctrines as the "essential governmental function" test should be
discarded.
' "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Holmes,
dissenting, in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 Sup. Ct. 451,
453, 72 L. ed. 857, 859 (1928).
